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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the main macroeconomic determinants of benefits 
and  costs  by  undertaking  processes  of  monetary  integration,  and  investigate  the 
possibility that currency unions could be lead to the creation of a global currency. 
In particular, we will consider two main costs and benefits predicted by the theory of 
Optimum  Currency  Areas:  (i)  the  business-cycle  correlation  between  the  candidate’s 
economy and that of the currency zone as a whole, and (ii) the candidate economy’s 
inflationary bias. 
Using  this  methodology,  the  results  of  the  paper  provide  empirical  evidence  of  the 
existence of several optimal currency areas in the world. Moreover, the creation of a 
world common currency area is not as unrealistic as it might seem at first sight. 
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Despite  the  globalization  process  and  the  increasing  integration  of  the  world 
economy, the current international monetary system is characterized by a roughly one-to-
one correspondence between the number of the independent countries and the number of 
currencies (184 members of the IMF are represented by about 170 currencies).  
This fragmentation of the international monetary system has been judged not optimal by 
many distinguished scholars. As Mundell wrote: 
 
 “If  some  spaceship  captain  came  down  from  outer  space  and  looked  at  the  way 
international  monetary  relations  are  conduced,  I  am  sure  she  would  be  very 
surprised….and  wonder  why  more  than  one  currency  was  needed  to  conduct 
international trade and payments in a world that aspired to a high degree of  free trade”. 
 
However,  as  pointed  out  by  Alesina,  Barro  and  Tenreyro  (2002)  the  recent 
history, specially the last decade, has been characterized by several examples of monetary 
integration. In 1999 twelve countries in Europe have adopted a single currency, the Euro, 
and  fifteen  new  EU  countries  will  join  the  EMU  as  soon  as  they    would  meet  the 
Maastricht criteria; Sweden, Denmark and UK have opted out, but they might adopt the 
Euro in the near future. Dollarization has been implemented in Ecuador, El Salvador and 
Guatemala recognized dollar as legal currency, and several other countries in South and 
Central America are considering the possibility to start the dollarization process. Six oil-
producing  countries  (Bahrain,  Kuwait,  Oman,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia  and  United  Arab 
Emirates) might form a currency union in the near future. Several African countries are   3 
considering the idea to adopt a common currency (the Dollar) or to create an independent 
common currency area, and the CFA zone has already a common currency the CFA franc 
that has been tied to the French franc and now to the Euro. In Asia, Japan is exploring 
what kind of monetary arrangement might make sense, and joint initiatives are underway 
with Korea. 
Moreover, the three areas holding the major currencies in the world (the U.S., the 
EMU and Japan) are not too different in terms of economic features, and are more similar 
than some of the new EU members to the EMU countries. Thus, from an economic point 
of view, a future scenario where, for example, the Federal Reserve (FRB), the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) would conduct a common monetary 
policy might be not less favorable than an enlarged European Monetary Union or a wide 
dollarization process. 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  analyze  the  possible  benefits  and  costs  by 
undertaking these processes of monetary integrations, and investigate the possibility that 
currency unions could be lead to the creation of a global currency
1. 
In particular, in line with many other researches in this topic
2 we will consider two main 
costs and benefits predicted by the theory of Optimum Currency Areas
3: (i) the business-
cycle correlation between the candidate’s economy and that of the currency zone as a 
whole,  and  (ii)  the  candidate  economy’s  inflationary  bias.  In  particular,  the  theory 
                                                 
1 By this term I am not necessarily considering the case that for example, U.S., Europe and Japan are giving 
up their own currencies, but rather the case of a multi-currency monetary union, a fixed exchange rate with 
a common monetary policy. 
    
2 See for example, Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro [2002], Alesina and Barro [2002], Tenreyro and Barro 
(2004), Furceri and Karras (2006a). 
 
3 The theory was first developed by Mundell (1961) and extended by the contributions of McKinnon (1963) 
and Kenen (1969).   4 
predicts that the more synchronized the business cycles among the member countries, the 
lower  the  probability  of  asymmetric  shocks,  and  thus  the  less  painful  the  loss  of 
independent monetary policy and of a flexible exchange rate for the member country. 
Moreover, in the case of high business-cycle correlation, it becomes more plausible to 
expect the Common Central Bank to respond to aggregate shocks and to implement these 
interventions with greater ease.  On the other hand, the greater the inflationary bias of the 
member country, the greater the advantage of adopting the common currency even if (or, 
in this case, because) it means giving up independent monetary policy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the 
traditional arguments in favor of currency unions. In section 3, we present the empirical 
methodology and the data used to evaluate costs and benefits from joining or creating a 
common currency area, and a world currency. Section 4 discusses the results obtained 
and, finally, section 5 contains the main conclusions. 
 
 
 2. Traditional Arguments  
 
It is possible to list two kinds of arguments in favor of a greater integration of the 
international monetary system and of a creation of a global common currency. 
First, the advantages argued for a regime of flexible exchange rates and several 
independent  monetary  authorities  such  as:  better  cushion  against  asymmetric  shocks, 
stabilizing speculative international capital movements, higher monetary discipline have 
not  proved  to  be  valid  in  the  recent  history.  In  fact,  for  example,  floating  has  been   5 
associated with higher overshooting during the Mexican Asian, Russian and Argentina 
crisis, speculative attacks have been source of destabilization, the consequence of the 
floating exchange rate regime in Mexico has been hyperinflation, and there is generally  
little independence of monetary policy in a regime of quasi-perfect capital movements.    
  The second kind of argument is directly associated to the benefits generated by a 
common  currency  area.  The  gain  from  a  common  currency  come  mainly  from  an 
enhanced  credibility  (Tenreyro  and  Barro,  2004)  and  hence  performance  in  terms  of 
lower inflation (eliminating thus the inflation bias problem pointed out by Barro and 
Gordon, 1983). In fact, to the extent that a currency union is the most costly monetary 
arrangement to break, then it is more credible also than a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Moreover, with a low inflation and a stable currency investors are willing to invest more, 
which in turns implies greater growth.  
Growth is also fostered through other two different channels: a common currency will 
tend  to  result  in  lower  interest  rates,  determining  thus  higher  investments  and  hence 
growth (Dornbusch, 2001); higher exchange rate stability will encourage international 
trade, implying higher growth (Rose, 2000 and Rose and van Wincoop, 2001). 
Another (possible) benefit coming from a currency union is the (possible) reduction of 
the stabilization cost, interpreted as business cycle synchronization between the client and 
the anchor country
4.  In fact, recent works in the literature such as  Frankel and Rose 
(1998), Rose and Engel (2002) and Furceri and Karras (2006b) have pointed out that 
currency union is an important determinant for business cycle synchronization.  
                                                 
4 Beginning with Frankel and Rose (1998), it has been proposed that cyclical synchronization may be 
endogenous, in the sense that it is itself affected by membership in a monetary union The effect of the 
creation of a monetary union on the cyclical synchronization could in theory be either positive or negative.  
In fact, it crucially depends on the nature of trade.     6 
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
 
Annual data on the GDP deflator and real GDP are retrieved from the IMF World 
Economic Outlook  (2005). They have been used to estimate various cost and benefit 
measures for 180 countries in the World: 29 advanced economies, 49 African countries, 
17 Central and East European countries, 13 Middle East countries, 26 states belonging to 
the  Commonwealth  and  Independent  States  and  Mongolia,  26  Developing  Asian 
countries and 33 nations located in the Western Hemisphere. 
The data series are available from 1993 to 2005 for all these economies, with the 
exceptions  of  some  of  the  new  countries,  such  as  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  Serbia-
Montenegro, for which data series are available respectively from 1995 and 1998. 
Benefits of joining or creating a common currency area are determined by the 
reduction  of  the  inflation  bias.  Thus,  benefits  are  measured  by  inflation  comparisons 
between  the  client  and  the  anchor  country.  Inflation  data  are  simply  obtained  by  the 
growth rate of the GDP deflator. 
 The costs of joining or creating a common currency area are measured in terms 
of  business  cycle  synchronization  between  the  client  and  the  anchor  country  (or  the 
average measure for the countries that would form the common currency area). Business 
cycle measures are obtained by detrending the series of real GDP. In particular, three 
different methods have been used to detrend the output series and obtain a measure of the 
cyclical output component.  
Letting ( ) t i t i Y y , , ln = , the first measure is simple differencing (growth rate of the 
real GDP):   7 
 
         1 , , , - - = t i t i t i y y c                                                         (1) 
The  second  and  the  third  method  use  the  Hodrick-Prescott  (HP)  filter,  proposed  by 
Hodrick and Prescott (1980). The filter decomposes the series to a cyclical  ( ) t i c ,  and a 
trend  ( ) t i g ,   component,  by  minimizing  with  respect  to  t i g , ,  for  0 > l   the  following 
quantity: 
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The second method consists of using the value recommended by Hodrick and Prescott for 
the smoothness parameter (l ) for annual data equal to 100.  
The third method consists to consider the smoothness parameter (l ) equal to 6.25. In 
fact,  as  pointed  out  by  Ravn  and  Uhlig  (2002),  the  Hodrick-Prescott  filter  with  this 
smoothness parameter produces cyclical components very close to those obtained by the 
Band-Pass filter proposed by Baxter and King (1995). 
While minor differences among the results obtained by the three filters are not difficult to 
detect (for example, differencing generally produces the most volatile series, while the 
HP filter with  l  equal to 6.25 the smoothest), the main characteristics are remarkably 
similar.  This robustness will be formally confirmed by the findings of the next section. 
Finally, business cycle  synchronization is measured by the  correlation of the cyclical 
components between the anchor and the client country. 
   8 
4. Empirical Results 
   
In this section we investigate the benefits and the costs of joining (or creating) a 
common currency area. In principle, currency area can take two forms. First, a country 
can  adopt  another  country’s  currency  (dollarization).  In  the  case  of  this  monetary 
arrangement the client country is giving up its monetary independence, and monetary 
policy is completely conducted by the anchor’s central bank. 
Second a group of countries create a common currency area (a new currency that 
is  common  to  the  group)
5.  Under  this  monetary  arrangement,  monetary  policy  is 
conducted by a common central bank (incorporating the preferences of all its members), 
the members of the common currency share the seignorage and the exchange rate might 
be free to float relative to other countries.  
Thus, in this paragraph we will investigate both types of monetary arrangements. 
In particular, in carrying out the analysis we will consider countries that are likely to 
dollarize (in the sense of its broader meaning) or to form together a currency union. For 
the dollarization case we will make use of the  Alesina and  Barro (2002) results: the 
probability to adopt a foreign anchor’s country increases when the client speaks the same 
language as the anchor, client and anchor are geographically close, the client was (or is) a 
colony of the anchor, the anchor is richer of the client.   
For the common currency area we will consider countries that are geographically 
close (belonging to the same geographic macro-area) and that are linked by political and 
economic arrangements (such as a common market, or a common parliament in the case 
of the European Union). 
                                                 
5 The EMU is the most striking example.   9 
 Finally, the section will analyze the possibility of a global currency (the case of a 
multi-currency monetary union, a fixed exchange rate with a common monetary policy)in 




There are, and probably there will be in the future, several monetary arrangements 
in Africa. For example, six Western African countries (Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone) are considering to adopt a common currency, eleven members
6 
of the South African Development Community (SADC) are considering to anchor their 
currencies to the US dollar or to the South African rand, and the CFA represents already 
a common currency area
7. 
  As we argued in the previous section, monetary integration is costly because the 
member country, by giving up independent monetary policy, loses some of the ability to 
respond to output shocks and thus to smooth the domestic business cycle. Thus, the size 
of the cost will depend on the correlation between the anchor (or the currency area) and 
the member that will adopt the new currency (or will join the currency area). In Table1, 
we  present  the  costs  for  each  of  the  African  countries  for  the  period  1993-2005, 
respectively to join the CFA, to form a wide African currency area, to adopt the U.S. 
dollar, the Euro or the Yen. 
                                                 
6  Botswana,  Lesotho  Malawi,  Mauritius,  Mozambique,  Namibia,  South  Africa,  Swaziland,  Tanzania, 
Zimbabwe.  The  other  three  members  of  the  SADC  (Angola,  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo,  and 
Seychelles) are not considering to oin the monetary union. 
 
7 It includes: Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo belonging 
to the BCEAO, and Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Republic of 
Congo belonging to the BEAC.    10 
Although the average business cycle correlation is not significantly high in any of the 
case considered, it is possible to see that for several countries (such as Algeria, Burkina 
Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of Congo, Côte 
d' Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal) it might 
not be costly to be part of an African common currency. On the converse, it does seem 
generally costly for the members of the CFA zone to have a common currency. Finally, 
there are only few cases in which the cost of adopting a foreign currency is not costly 
(Gambia, and Swaziland the U.S. dollar, Cape Verde, Gambia, Swaziland and Zambia the 
Euro, Lesotho and South Africa the Yen)
8.   
  The benefits of a currency union are mainly imputable to the reduction of the 
inflation bias. Thus, larger is the ex-ante inflation bias, larger will be the benefits to adopt 
a  common  currency.  In  Table  2  we  present  the  average  (for  the  period  1993-2005) 
inflation bias for each of the African countries with respect to the CFA area, Africa as 
whole, U.S., the Euro area and Japan. Two main results emerge analyzing the table. First, 
since inflation biases are the same for most African countries, the inflation rates are the 
same. This, together with the business cycle synchronization results, implies that several 
African  countries  (those  cited  before  for  example)  seem  to  be  part  already  of  an 
hypothetical African common currency, where business cycles are aligned and inflation 
preferences are the same.  
Second, in terms of benefits, the optimal solution (the best anchor) is represented 
by the Yen and the countries that would benefit more by the adoption of an external 
currency are Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe.    
                                                 
8 Similar results are obtained using the HP filter with a smoothness parameter of 100, and Differencing. For 
example, the average business cycle synchronization with Africa is 0.20 with HP (100) and 0.39 with 
Differencing. All the correlation results are available upon request to the author.   11 
MIDDLE-EAST  
In  the  last  decade  there  have  been  attempts  toward  a  creation  of  a  common 
currency in the Middle-East. In particular, six-oil producing countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia  and  United  Arab  Emirates)  are  considering  seriously  the 
possibility to adopt a common currency by 2010.  
In Table 3 and 4 we show the costs and the benefits for the period 1993-2005 for 
these (and the other Middle-East) countries to adopt a common currency:  a new (or old) 
Middle East currency, the U.S. dollar, the Euro or the Yen. 
Analyzing  Table  3,  it  is  possible  to  see  that  the  cost  to  adopt  a  Middle-East 
common  currency  are  negligible  for  most  of  the  countries.  In  fact,  business  cycle 
synchronization  is  remarkable  high  not  only  for  those  countries  willing  to  adopt  a 
common currency by 2010, but also for many other countries. The only countries that 
show  a  remarkable  cost  are  Egypt,  Jordan  and  Lebanon.  Moreover,  in  terms  of 
stabilization cost, for none of these countries could be convenient, to dollarize
9. 
On  the  benefits  side,  two  main  results  emerge  looking  at  Table  4.  First,  the 
inflation rate is almost the same for all the Middle-East countries, except Iran, Libya and 
the Republic of Yemen, which have very high inflation rates
10. This results,  together with 
the costs analyzed before, implies that several Middle-East  countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Libya,  Omar,  Qatar,  Saudi  Arabia,  Syrian  Arab  Republic  and  United Arab  Emirates) 
seem  to  be  part  already  of  an  hypothetical  Middle-East  common  currency,  where 
business cycles are aligned and inflation preferences are the same.  
                                                 
9 Same conclusions are obtained using the HP filter with a smoothness parameter of 100, and Differencing. 
For example, the average business cycle synchronization with the Middle-East is 0.43 with HP (100) and 
0.49 with Differencing.  
 
10 This is causing the negative inflation bias for the rest of the countries.    12 
Second, in terms of benefits, the optimal solution (the best anchor) is represented, 
as in the African case, by the Yen.  
 
EUROPE 
In 1999, twelve European Union members (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain), formed 
the EMU
11. Other three old EU members opted out and probably will join the EMU in the 
future. Moreover, on 1 May 2004 the European Union (EU) welcomed ten new members: 
the  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Hungary,  Malta,  Poland, 
Slovenia  and  Slovakia.    In  addition,  five  other  countries  are  at  various  stages  of 
candidacy  for  membership  in  the  EU:  Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Romania,  Turkey  and  the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It is almost certain that this integration process 
will lead the accession countries to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) in the 
future. As has been underlined during the accession negotiations, which were held in 
Copenhagen in December 2002, once these countries will have achieved economic and 
budgetary results in line with the Maastricht Treaty, they will join the single currency. In 
fact, none of the countries asked for dispensation and no ‘out’ options were granted. This 
means that the new (and, eventually, the prospective) EU countries should be considered 
candidates  for  the  euro  once  they  meet  the  convergence  criteria.  The  main  question, 
therefore, is whether these economies should expect to obtain net benefits from EMU 
membership. 
Analyzing  Table  5  and  6  we  try  to  answer  to  this  question.  Moreover,  we 
investigate  if  other  independent  European  countries  could  benefit  from  adopting  a 
                                                 
11 Greece joined the EMU in 2001.   13 
common currency (the Euro, the U.S. dollar or the Yen). Table 5 shows the business 
cycle synchronization (for each European country with EMU) for the period 1993-2005. 
The results in Table 5 point out several indications. First, the EMU countries are 
not surprisingly well synchronized. Germany is the country with the highest business 
cycle  synchronization  with  the  EMU.  However,  other  EU  countries,  such  as  Cyprus, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia, Sweden and United Kingdom, have 
cycles  well  aligned  with  EMU.  In  particular,  some  countries,  such  as  Slovenia  and 
Sweden,  have  higher  synchronization  than  most  EMU  countries.    Moreover,  also  for 
other European countries (such as Croatia, Macedonia, and Switzerland) it would not be 
costly to adopt the Euro.  
For the rest of the countries the business cycles correlations are low with respect 
to the other currencies analyzed. An exception however is made by Iceland that shows a 
business cycle well aligned with the U.S.
12. 
 The benefits, in terms of inflation, are shown in Table 6. Analyzing the table, it is 
possible to see that the inflation bias is negligible for most of the countries with respect to 
the EMU (but also with respect to the U.S. and Japan). In particular, the countries that 
would benefit more by adopting the Euro would be the Central and Eastern European 
countries, especially the EU accession countries (Croatia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania 
and Turkey). 
To conclude, these results suggest that an enlargement of the current EMU would 
be not only possible but also not costly for most of the European countries
13.   
                                                 
12 Similar results are obtained using the HP filter with a smoothness parameter of 100, and Differencing. 
For example, the average business cycle synchronization with EMU is 0.44 with HP (100) and 0.41 with 
Differencing.    14 
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES AND MONGOLIA (CISM) 
  Although  there  have  not  been  any  attempts  toward  any  process  of  monetary 
integration  in  this  area,  we  have  thought  that  it  could  be  interesting  to  analyze  the 
desirability of a common currency for those countries that were part of the Soviet Union 
before  the  collapse  and  that  have  not  been  polarized  (yet)  by  the  European  Union. 
Moreover, several economic initiatives have this area as target
14. 
  In Table 7 and 8 we show the costs and the benefits for these countries to adopt a 
common currency:  a new currency, the U.S. dollar, the Euro or the Yen. Looking at 
Table 7, it is possible to observe an almost perfect business cycle synchronization for the 
period 1993-2005 in this area. This would imply that the creation of a Commonwealth 
common currency would be not costly for its members. On the converse, the business 
cycles for each of these countries are weak correlated with those of the EMU, U.S. and 
Japan
15. 
  On the benefits side, it is possible to see that these countries have similar inflation 
rate
16.  Nevertheless,  the  countries  that  would  benefit  more  from  the  creation  of  the 
Commonwealth currency union or from the dollarization process would be Belarus and 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Russia. 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 See  Furceri  and  Karras  (2006a)  for  a  more  detailed discussion  about  the  costs  and  benefits  for  the 
European countries to join the EMU. 
 
14 An example is represented by the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(TACIS) Program of the European Union that provides grant finance for know-how to support the process 
of  transformation  to  market  economies  and  democratic  societies  in  the  New  Independent  States  and 
Mongolia. 
 
15 Similar results are obtained using the HP filter with a smoothness parameter of 100, and Differencing. 
For example, the average business cycle synchronization with the Commonwealth as a whole is 0.90 with 
HP (100) and 0.91 with Differencing. 
 
16 To the purpose of this analysis we considered the period 1998-2003, since immediately the year after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union are characterized by outlier high values of inflation for these countries.   15 
To conclude, the results suggest that several independent states belonging to the 
Commonwealth seem to be part of a hypothetical currency union, where business cycles 
are aligned and inflation preferences are very similar.  
   
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
  Enthusiasm  for  dollarization  and  monetary  integration  has  spread  fast  in  this 
geographic area during the last decade. In particular, dollarization has been implemented 
in Ecuador and Panama, El Salvador and Guatemala recognized dollar as legal currency, 
and several other countries in South and Central America are considering seriously the 
possibility to start the dollarization process. 
Moreover, the Eastern Caribbean Currency Area (ECCA) represents the first form 
of currency union in America
17. 
In  this  section  we  present  the  results  in  terms  of  costs  (business  cycle 
synchronization) and benefits (reduction of the inflation bias) for the North, Central and 
South American countries, for the period 1993-2005. 
Starting with the costs (Table 7), it is possible to see that there are some countries 
with  cycles  well  synchronized  with  the  U.S.  cycle,  such  as  Bahamas,  Barbados, 
Dominica, Ecuador (already dollarized), Grenada, St. Lucia and Uruguay. Nevertheless, 
the average business cycle synchronization is quite low, and is actually the same of that 
obtained considering the EMU as the anchor country. This, perhaps, is due to the scarce 
synchronization of most of the South American countries. In fact, most of them show 
negative correlation with respect to the US. 
                                                 
17 This includes: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and 
the  Grenadines.  However,  although  these  countries  have  a  common  central  bank,  their  currency  (the 
Caribbean dollar) has been anchored to the U.S. dollar since 1976.   16 
  Moreover, two particular cases deserve particular attention. First, surprising and 
in contrast with other works
18,
 Canada does not show a particularly high business cycle 
synchronization.  Second,  the  dollarized  countries  (Ecuador,  Panama,  El  Salvador  and 
Guatemala)   suggest that their choice has not been too costly (in terms of stabilization). 
In particular, comparing our results with those obtained by Karras (2002), it emerges that 
Guatemala and Panama have remarkably increased their business cycle synchronization 
with the U.S.
19 
  On the benefits side, it is possible to observe that the greater inflation reduction 
would occur for the South American countries. Not, surprisingly in fact, these countries 
have  been  historically  characterized  by  high  inflation  and  in  some  periods  by 
hyperinflation.  On the converse, some countries, such as Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, 
Canada,  Dominica  and  St.  Lucia  would  not  benefit  from  dollarization  (in  terms  of 
inflation bias).  Same conclusions are obtained analyzing the inflation bias compared 
with the Euro and the Yen. 
To conclude, it is interesting to note that it seems to be a positive correlation 
between costs and benefits of dollarization for these countries. This makes dollarization a 
question particularly difficult to answer. However, for some countries, such as Ecuador 
and  Uruguay,  characterized  by  high  business  cycle  synchronization  and  very  high 
inflation, there is no doubts about the fact that dollarization would provide net benefit. 
 
                                                 
18 For example, Karras (2002) find that over the period 1950-1990, Canada is the American country with 
the highest busyness cycle correlation with the U.S. Our result then implies that during the last decade this 
synchronization has decreased. 
 
19 Same conclusions of those reported in this section are obtained using the HP filter with a smoothness 
parameter of 100, and Differencing. For example, the average business cycle synchronization with the U.S. 
is 0.23 with HP (100) and 0.23 with Differencing.   17 
ASIA AND OCEANIA 
  To  conclude  our  currency  union’s  investigation,  we  analyze  the  possibility  in 
terms of macroeconomic benefits and costs of a currency union in Asia and Oceania, 
considering as possible anchor currency the Yen, the U.S. dollar and the Euro. 
  In Table 11 we show the results in terms of stabilization cost for the period 1993-
2005 using the HP filter with a smoothness parameter equal to 6.25.  Looking at the table, 
it is possible to see that most of the countries have not well aligned cycles with Japan, the 
Euro area or the US. Thus, the loss of their independent monetary policy would be very 
costly. However, there is some exception. For example, there is an high synchronization 
between  India,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Philippines  and  Japan,  and  a  high  correlation 
between Australia, Sri Lanka, Kiribati and the US
20. 
  On the benefits side, the results of the inflation bias computed over the period 
1993-2005 show (Table 12) that for all the countries would be beneficial to anchor their 
currencies to the Yen. This result, in fact is due to the very low inflation rate in Japan. 
However, also an Asia-Oceania currency union in which the inflation preferences follow 
those of the larger economic countries such as Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, 
and Australia would provide reduction of the inflation bias for the rest of the countries. 
To conclude, it is possible to see that for most of the countries high costs are associated 
with high benefits, making thus difficult an evaluation of the net costs. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Same conclusions of those reported in this section are obtained using the HP filter with a smoothness 
parameter of 100, and Differencing. For example, the average business cycle synchronization with Japan is 
0.16 with HP (100) and 0.21 with Differencing. 
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WORLD CURRENCY 
The empirical results analyzed in the previous sections of this paragraph have 
shown  that  there  are  several  areas,  such  as  Europe,  the  Middle-East,  Africa,  the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and Mongolia, in which  the creation of a common 
currency  union  would  be  beneficial,  and  where  business  cycles  are  well  aligned  and 
inflation  preferences  the  same.  Moreover,  for  many  Central  and  South  American 
countries could be advantageous to dollarize as for many Asian countries to adopt the 
Yen as legal currency. 
The  further  question  is  if  the  all  these  area  considered  together  could  form  a 
global  multi-currency  monetary  union  with  a  fixed  exchange  rate  and  a  common 
monetary policy.   To this purpose, as we did for the local currency union cases, we 
consider the main macroeconomic determinants of benefits and costs by undertaking this 
monetary integration process. 
In Table 13 we present the results in terms of stabilization costs. The results show 
that during the period 1993-2005 the business cycle synchronization is quite high for 
several areas such as Africa, the CISM, the Western Hemisphere, Europe and the EMU 
countries. Moreover, looking at the second and third column of the table it is possible to 
see that business cycle synchronization is overall remarkably increased in the last six 
years. The average busyness cycle synchronization in the period 1999-2005 is 0.53 (much 
higher than the average correlation for the overall period 1993-2005), and excluding Asia 
and Oceania, all the areas have business cycles very well aligned
21.  
                                                 
21 The average business cycle correlation for these areas is 0.71. 
Same conclusions of those reported in this section are obtained using the HP filter with a smoothness 
parameter of 100, and Differencing. For example, the average business cycle synchronization with the 
World is 0.26 with HP (100) and 0.56 with Differencing during the period 1993-2005.   19 
Moreover, the fact that the larger increase has occurred for the most influential 
(and largest) economic areas (such as US, Europe and the EMU, the Middle-East and 
Asia)  is  certainly  an  ulterior  favorable  element  that  would  make  easier  the 
implementation of the world common currency area. In fact, given the recent empirical 
evidence of the effect of currency union on business cycle correlations, is not unrealistic 
to assume that the creation of a world common currency area will increase the business 
cycle synchronization for most of the countries, reducing thus the ex-ante stabilization 
costs.  
Repeating  the  same  comparison  for  the  inflation  rates,  we  can  see  that  the 
inflation rates are remarkably decreased for most of the countries, especially for those 
characterized by hyperinflation. Moreover, the patterns of the average and of the standard 
deviation inflation rate suggest that countries are becoming much more similar over time 
in terms of inflation preferences. Nevertheless, the areas that would benefit more by a 
common world currency will be those including the developing countries.  
To conclude, the empirical results of costs and benefits suggest that the creation 
of a world currency is not as unrealistic as might seem at first sight, at least form an 
economic  point  of  view.  In  fact,  the  busyness  cycle  synchronization  is  remarkable 
increased over time and at the same way inflation preferences are becoming more similar 
among  countries.  Moreover,  this  monetary  arrangement,  although  beneficial  for  most 
countries, would be particularly advantageous for most developing areas (such as the 
Western Hemisphere, Middle East, CISM and Africa) characterized by remarkably high 
inflation rates, and increasing business cycle synchronization. 
   20 
5. Conclusions 
Despite  the  globalization  process  and  the  increasing  integration  of  the  world 
economy, the current international monetary system is characterized by a roughly one-to-
one correspondence between the number of the independent countries and the number of 
currencies.  However,  at  the  same  time  the  recent  history  has  been  characterized  by 
several examples of monetary integration such as the creation of the EMU, the case of 
dollarization in South America, and a number of attempts toward a common currency in 
Africa and in the Middle East.  
The weakness of the arguments in favor of flexible exchange rates and the recent 
works in the literature showing the benefits coming from currency unions suggest that a 
global monetary integration would be beneficial for most of the countries, specially in an 
a world that aims  to a high degree of  free trade. 
  Analyzing two main macroeconomic costs and benefits predicted by the 
theory  of  Optimum  Currency  Areas  (the  business-cycle  correlation  between  the 
candidate’s  economy  and  that  of  the  currency  zone  as  a  whole,  and  the  candidate 
economy’s inflationary bias) the results of the paper provide empirical evidence of the 
existence of several optimal currency areas in the world. Moreover, the creation of a 
world common currency area is not as unrealistic as it might seem at first sight.  
In particular, the empirical results analyzed in the previous sections have shown 
that there are several areas, such as Europe, the Middle-East, Africa, the Commonwealth 
of Independent States and Mongolia, in which  the creation of a local common currency 
union  would  be  beneficial,  and  where  business  cycles  are  well  aligned  and  inflation 
preferences the same. Moreover, for many Central and South American countries could   21 
be  advantageous  to  dollarize  as  for  many  Asian  countries  to  adopt  the  Yen  as  legal 
currency. 
At the same time, all these macro area (Africa, EMU, the rest of the European 
countries, Asia and Oceania, the North, Central and South America, the Middle East) are 
becoming more synchronized over time, and inflation patterns are rapidly converging 
toward lower level. Moreover, the fact that the larger increase in synchronization has 
occurred for the most influential (and largest) economic areas (such as US, Europe and 
the EMU, the Middle-East and Asia) is certainly an ulterior favorable element that would 
make easier the implementation of the world common currency area. 
To concluder, this monetary arrangement, although beneficial for most countries, 
would  be  particularly  advantageous  for  most  developing  areas  (such  as  the  Western 
Hemisphere, Middle East, CISM and Africa) characterized by remarkably high inflation 
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Table1. Business Cycle Syncronization in Africa (HP 6.25)
Country CFA Africa $ ￿ ¥
Algeria 0.03 0.60 -0.04 -0.25 -0.74
Angola 0.07 0.27 0.21 -0.03 -0.72
Benin* 0.01 0.45 -0.13 -0.06 -0.27
Botswana*** -0.09 0.10 0.53 0.50 -0.11
Burkina Faso* 0.10 0.52 0.06 0.08 0.00
Burundi -0.22 -0.17 -0.45 -0.52 -0.29
Cameroon* 0.13 0.54 0.32 0.21 -0.33
Cape Verde 0.18 0.04 0.36 0.70 0.44
Central African Republic* 0.21 0.58 0.32 0.35 -0.29
Chad* -0.05 0.54 0.07 -0.18 -0.30
Comoros 0.17 0.61 0.11 0.03 -0.20
Congo, Democratic Republic of 0.04 0.40 0.38 -0.22 -0.48
Congo, Republic of* 0.28 0.76 -0.40 -0.44 -0.46
Côte d' Ivoire* 0.29 0.68 0.28 0.38 0.02
Djibouti -0.09 0.04 0.09 0.16 -0.58
Equatorial Guinea* 0.60 0.98 0.11 0.09 -0.34
Eritrea 0.25 0.35 -0.11 -0.45 -0.33
Ethiopia 0.36 -0.05 -0.38 0.13 0.33
Gabon* 0.26 0.80 -0.22 -0.35 -0.42
Gambia, The** 0.13 0.23 0.59 0.69 -0.08
Ghana** -0.17 0.23 0.49 0.16 -0.56
Guinea** 0.02 0.24 -0.21 -0.05 -0.38
Guinea-Bissau* 0.16 0.17 -0.25 0.02 0.44
Kenya 0.27 0.08 0.20 0.61 0.45
Lesotho*** 0.50 0.11 -0.17 0.01 0.76
Madagascar -0.05 0.30 0.26 0.19 -0.21
Malawi*** 0.16 0.57 0.42 0.01 -0.32
Mali* 0.22 0.69 0.01 -0.09 -0.19
Mauritania -0.44 -0.41 -0.51 -0.16 0.03
Mauritius*** 0.15 0.27 -0.39 -0.13 -0.28
Morocco 0.04 0.01 0.09 -0.05 -0.06
Mozambique*** 0.06 0.45 0.31 0.31 -0.63
Namibia*** -0.17 -0.01 0.54 0.07 0.00
Niger* 0.15 0.71 -0.03 -0.14 -0.22
Nigeria** 0.23 0.56 0.18 0.17 -0.51
Rwanda 0.00 0.47 -0.19 0.06 -0.47
São Tomé and Príncipe -0.54 -0.50 -0.36 -0.31 -0.15
Senegal* 0.15 0.52 -0.01 0.04 0.09
Seychelles 0.35 0.40 -0.02 0.21 0.42
Sierra Leone** -0.25 -0.45 -0.61 -0.53 -0.40
South Africa*** 0.45 -0.06 0.32 0.49 0.77
Sudan -0.17 -0.10 0.10 0.34 -0.44
Swaziland*** 0.36 0.47 0.77 0.65 0.05
Tanzania*** -0.15 0.06 -0.36 -0.32 -0.06
Togo* -0.05 0.27 -0.06 -0.02 0.04
Tunisia -0.15 0.10 0.09 -0.20 -0.14
Uganda 0.08 -0.38 -0.13 0.05 0.36
Zambia*** 0.42 0.40 0.26 0.53 0.39
Zimbabwe*** 0.17 0.31 0.00 0.48 -0.24
Average 0.09 0.28 0.05 0.07 -0.13
Note:* CFA countries; ** Western African Countries; *** SADC (11) countries.    25 
Table2. Inflation bias in Africa (percentage points)
Country CFA Africa $ ￿ ¥
Algeria 3.83 -18.76 10.39 9.50 13.04
Angola 798.33 775.75 804.90 804.01 807.54
Benin* -1.89 -24.48 4.68 3.78 7.32
Botswana*** -0.69 -23.27 5.88 4.99 8.53
Burkina Faso* -4.84 -27.42 1.73 0.84 4.37
Burundi 0.42 -22.16 6.99 6.10 9.63
Cameroon* -4.83 -27.41 1.74 0.85 4.38
Cape Verde -4.36 -26.95 2.20 1.31 4.85
Central African Republic* -3.92 -26.50 2.65 1.76 5.29
Chad* -0.03 -22.61 6.54 5.65 9.18
Comoros -4.00 -26.59 2.56 1.67 5.21
Congo, Democratic Republic of 240.17 217.59 246.74 245.85 249.38
Congo, Republic of* 0.61 -21.98 7.17 6.28 9.82
Côte d' Ivoire* -2.11 -24.70 4.46 3.57 7.10
Djibouti -5.50 -28.09 1.07 0.17 3.71
Equatorial Guinea* 4.62 -17.97 11.19 10.30 13.83
Eritrea 3.12 -19.46 9.69 8.80 12.33
Ethiopia -2.93 -25.52 3.64 2.75 6.28
Gabon* -1.21 -23.79 5.36 4.47 8.00
Gambia, The** -0.33 -22.91 6.24 5.35 8.88
Ghana** 16.90 -5.68 23.47 22.58 26.11
Guinea** -2.25 -24.83 4.32 3.43 6.96
Guinea-Bissau* 0.62 -21.96 7.19 6.30 9.83
Kenya 2.73 -19.86 9.29 8.40 11.94
Lesotho*** -0.45 -23.03 6.12 5.23 8.76
Madagascar 7.24 -15.35 13.80 12.91 16.45
Malawi*** 20.15 -2.44 26.71 25.82 29.36
Mali* -2.57 -25.15 4.00 3.11 6.64
Mauritania -2.05 -24.63 4.52 3.63 7.16
Mauritius*** -3.03 -25.62 3.53 2.64 6.18
Morocco -6.60 -29.18 -0.03 -0.92 2.61
Mozambique*** 13.29 -9.30 19.86 18.97 22.50
Namibia*** 0.25 -22.33 6.82 5.93 9.46
Niger* -3.41 -25.99 3.16 2.27 5.80
Nigeria** 14.31 -8.28 20.87 19.98 23.52
Rwanda 2.18 -20.41 8.74 7.85 11.39
São Tomé and Príncipe 25.66 3.08 32.23 31.34 34.87
Senegal* -4.67 -27.25 1.90 1.01 4.54
Seychelles -5.28 -27.86 1.29 0.40 3.93
Sierra Leone** 11.66 -10.92 18.23 17.34 20.87
South Africa*** -0.31 -22.89 6.26 5.37 8.90
Sudan 41.34 18.75 47.90 47.01 50.55
Swaziland*** 2.97 -19.61 9.54 8.65 12.18
Tanzania*** 5.58 -17.01 12.15 11.26 14.79
Togo* -3.12 -25.70 3.45 2.56 6.10
Tunisia -6.22 -28.80 0.35 -0.54 2.99
Uganda -1.28 -23.87 5.29 4.39 7.93
Zambia*** 29.33 6.75 35.90 35.01 38.54
Zimbabwe*** 94.87 72.28 101.43 100.54 104.08
Note:* CFA countries; ** Western African Countries; *** SADC (11) countries.    26 
Table3. Business Cycle Syncronization in the Middle-East  (HP 6.25)
Country Middle-East $ ￿ ¥
Bahrain* 0.80 -0.44 -0.53 -0.67
Egypt -0.23 0.03 0.45 -0.07
Iran, Islamic Republic of 0.42 0.20 0.25 0.08
Jordan -0.38 -0.57 -0.23 0.29
Kuwait* 0.83 -0.24 -0.49 -0.79
Lebanon -0.31 0.03 0.02 0.30
Libya 0.70 0.07 0.01 -0.52
Oman* 0.91 -0.34 -0.33 -0.62
Qatar* 0.80 0.06 -0.04 -0.36
Saudi Arabia* 0.82 -0.12 -0.28 -0.80
Syrian Arab Republic 0.85 -0.37 -0.52 -0.42
United Arab Emirates* 0.71 -0.40 -0.26 -0.36
Yemen, Republic of 0.89 -0.26 -0.37 -0.66
Average 0.53 -0.18 -0.18 -0.35
Note:* countries considering to adopt a common currency by 2010  
 
Table4. Inflation bias in the Middle-East  (percentage points)
Country Middle-East $ ￿ ¥
Bahrain* -4.93 -0.45 0.44 3.09
Egypt -1.00 3.48 4.37 7.02
Iran, Islamic Republic of 17.44 21.92 22.81 25.46
Jordan -4.64 -0.16 0.73 3.38
Kuwait* -2.84 1.64 2.53 5.18
Lebanon -1.42 3.06 3.95 6.59
Libya 2.93 7.41 8.30 10.95
Oman* -5.19 -0.71 0.18 2.82
Qatar* -2.97 1.51 2.40 5.05
Saudi Arabia* -2.55 1.93 2.82 5.47
Syrian Arab Republic -1.39 3.09 3.98 6.62
United Arab Emirates* -4.25 0.23 1.12 3.76
Yemen, Republic of 10.79 15.27 16.17 18.81
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Table5. Business Cycle Syncronization in Europe (HP 6.25)
Country ￿ $ ¥
Albania 0.48 0.14 0.46
Austria* 0.90 0.68 -0.01
Belgium* 0.89 0.55 0.52
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.01 0.13 0.37
Bulgaria -0.18 -0.28 -0.06
Croatia 0.52 0.19 0.47
Cyprus** 0.66 0.20 0.12
Czech Republic** 0.21 -0.21 0.79
Denmark** 0.48 0.40 0.17
Estonia** 0.56 0.29 0.21
Finland* 0.68 0.79 0.44
France* 0.86 0.51 0.19
Germany* 0.92 0.55 0.49
Greece* 0.66 0.21 0.51
Hungary** 0.54 0.40 -0.34
Iceland 0.48 0.77 0.38
Ireland* 0.80 0.51 0.60
Italy* 0.69 0.28 0.08
Latvia** 0.52 0.17 0.12
Lithuania** 0.56 0.24 0.30
Luxembourg* 0.70 0.49 -0.16
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 0.55 0.31 0.36
Malta** 0.59 0.36 0.13
Netherlands* 0.88 0.82 0.13
Norway -0.50 -0.28 -0.39
Poland** -0.18 0.32 0.08
Portugal* 0.82 0.67 0.21
Romania 0.21 -0.07 0.57
Serbia and Montenegro -0.32 0.33 -0.18
Slovak Republic** 0.28 0.11 0.40
Slovenia** 0.91 0.74 0.32
Spain* 0.91 0.67 0.03
Sweden** 0.82 0.69 0.31
Switzerland 0.86 0.54 0.30
Turkey -0.03 0.24 0.41
United Kingdom** 0.51 0.32 0.49
Average 0.51 0.36 0.24
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Table6. Infaltion bias in Europe (percentage points)
Country ￿ $ ¥
Austria* -1.12 -0.23 2.41
Belgium* -0.95 -0.06 2.58
Cyprus** 0.41 1.30 3.94
Denmark** -0.94 -0.05 2.59
Finland* -1.05 -0.16 2.48
France* -1.29 -0.40 2.24
Germany* -1.53 -0.64 2.00
Greece* 3.23 4.12 6.77
Iceland 0.64 1.53 4.18
Ireland* 0.95 1.84 4.48
Italy* 0.27 1.16 3.80
Luxembourg* -0.08 0.81 3.45
Netherlands* -0.48 0.41 3.05
Norway 0.69 1.58 4.22
Portugal* 1.13 2.02 4.66
Spain* 0.94 1.83 4.47
Sweden** -1.02 -0.13 2.51
Switzerland -1.97 -1.07 1.57
United Kingdom** -0.33 0.56 3.20
Albania 15.13 16.02 18.66
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.67 1.56 4.21
Bulgaria 100.40 101.29 103.93
Croatia 122.40 123.30 125.94
Czech Republic** 4.19 5.08 7.72
Estonia** 15.88 16.77 19.42
Hungary** 10.50 11.39 14.03
Latvia** 11.30 12.19 14.83
Lithuania** 32.14 33.03 35.67
Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 46.41 47.30 49.94
Malta** 0.13 1.02 3.66
Poland** 10.18 11.07 13.71
Romania 62.37 63.26 65.91
Serbia and Montenegro 40.86 41.75 44.40
Slovak Republic** 5.15 6.05 8.69
Slovenia** 8.13 9.02 11.66
Turkey 53.84 54.73 57.37





   29 
Table7. Business Cycle Syncronization in the CISM  (HP 6.25)
Country Commonwealth $ ￿ ¥
Armenia 0.78 0.02 0.25 0.12
Azerbaijan 0.90 0.21 0.28 -0.16
Belarus 0.75 0.12 0.04 0.02
Georgia 0.79 0.17 0.39 0.21
Kazakhstan 0.86 0.12 0.32 0.08
Kyrgyz Republic 0.68 0.17 0.39 0.31
Moldova 0.68 0.10 0.36 0.30
Mongolia 0.73 0.49 0.60 0.07
Russia 0.84 0.17 0.36 0.18
Tajikistan 0.54 0.26 0.50 -0.41
Turkmenistan 0.61 0.17 0.26 -0.58
Ukraine 0.95 0.25 0.43 0.03
Uzbekistan 0.88 0.28 0.38 0.03
Average 0.77 0.19 0.35 0.02
 
 
Table8. Inflation bias in the CISM  (percentage points)
Country Commonwealth $ ￿ ¥
Armenia -7.53 1.98 1.42 5.27
Azerbaijan -6.41 3.10 2.54 6.40
Belarus 16.13 25.64 25.08 28.93
Georgia -6.66 2.85 2.29 6.14
Kazakhstan -2.03 7.48 6.92 10.77
Kyrgyz Republic -8.01 1.49 0.93 4.79
Moldova -0.48 9.02 8.46 12.32
Mongolia -6.01 3.49 2.93 6.79
Russia 4.88 14.39 13.83 17.68
Tajikistan 7.22 16.72 16.17 20.02
Turkmenistan -5.27 4.23 3.67 7.53
Ukraine -0.85 8.65 8.10 11.95
Uzbekistan 15.02 24.52 23.97 27.82
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Table9. Business Cycle Syncronization in America (HP 6.25)
Country $ ￿ ¥
Antigua and Barbuda* 0.37 0.09 -0.35
Argentina 0.24 -0.09 0.02
Bahamas, The 0.73 0.70 0.47
Barbados 0.74 0.43 0.05
Belize -0.02 -0.04 -0.23
Bolivia -0.30 -0.38 -0.63
Brazil 0.17 0.44 0.29
Canada 0.34 0.40 -0.59
Chile -0.04 0.17 0.32
Colombia -0.48 -0.43 0.48
Costa Rica 0.27 -0.05 -0.57
Dominica* 0.74 0.66 0.33
Dominican Republic -0.29 0.13 -0.41
Ecuador 0.73 0.76 0.04
El Salvador 0.41 0.28 -0.80
Grenada* 0.55 0.65 0.27
Guatemala 0.49 0.69 0.35
Guyana -0.17 -0.12 0.38
Haiti -0.12 0.25 -0.01
Honduras -0.35 -0.35 -0.35
Jamaica 0.26 0.66 0.01
Mexico 0.06 -0.18 -0.49
Netherlands Antilles -0.46 -0.54 -0.67
Nicaragua -0.25 -0.39 0.20
Panama 0.48 0.30 -0.26
Paraguay 0.19 0.48 0.22
Peru -0.15 -0.34 0.13
St. Kitts and Nevis* -0.24 0.04 0.64
St. Lucia* 0.63 0.15 0.07
St. Vincent and the Grenadines* 0.28 0.35 -0.03
Suriname 0.20 0.11 -0.09
Trinidad and Tobago -0.25 -0.24 -0.59
Uruguay 0.73 0.75 0.12
Venezuela -0.04 0.05 -0.47
Average 0.16 0.16 -0.06
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Table10. Inflation bias in America (percentage points)
Country $ ￿ ¥
Antigua and Barbuda* -0.19 -1.08 2.45
Argentina 2.49 1.60 5.13
Bahamas, The 0.46 -0.43 3.11
Barbados 0.61 -0.28 3.25
Belize -0.66 -1.55 1.98
Bolivia 3.89 3.00 6.54
Brazil 13.41 12.52 16.05
Canada -0.07 -0.96 2.58
Chile 3.47 2.58 6.12
Colombia 11.25 10.36 13.89
Costa Rica 10.37 9.48 13.01
Dominica* -0.03 -0.92 2.61
Dominican Republic 10.34 9.45 12.98
Ecuador 3.22 2.33 5.86
El Salvador 2.73 1.84 5.38
Grenada* 0.28 -0.61 2.92
Guatemala 6.21 5.32 8.85
Guyana 5.00 4.10 7.64
Haiti 16.10 15.21 18.75
Honduras 12.10 11.21 14.75
Jamaica 12.98 12.09 15.63
Mexico 11.81 10.92 14.45
Netherlands Antilles 0.34 -0.56 2.98
Nicaragua 12.60 11.71 15.24
Panama 0.06 -0.83 2.70
Paraguay 8.87 7.98 11.51
Peru 8.05 7.16 10.69
St. Kitts and Nevis* 0.59 -0.30 3.23
St. Lucia* -0.29 -1.18 2.35
St. Vincent and the Grenadines* 0.18 -0.72 2.82
Suriname 84.71 83.82 87.35
Trinidad and Tobago 3.29 2.40 5.93
Uruguay 17.04 16.15 19.68
Venezuela 36.29 35.40 38.94
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Table11. Business Cycle Syncronization in Asia and Oceania (HP 6.25)
Country ¥ $ ￿
Australia -0.51 0.62 0.28
Bangladesh -0.04 -0.39 -0.15
Bhutan -0.35 -0.16 -0.25
Brunei Darussalam -0.55 -0.47 -0.27
Cambodia 0.50 0.15 0.44
China -0.53 0.05 0.07
Fiji* 0.30 -0.19 -0.04
Hong Kong SAR 0.25 -0.08 0.13
India 0.79 0.13 0.36
Indonesia 0.65 -0.33 -0.21
Kiribati* 0.06 0.88 0.79
Korea -0.12 -0.33 -0.54
Lao People' s Democratic Republic 0.41 -0.52 -0.51
Malaysia 0.62 -0.29 -0.03
Maldives -0.11 0.29 0.16
Myanmar 0.44 -0.19 0.26
Nepal 0.45 -0.09 0.31
New Zealand 0.20 -0.20 -0.25
Pakistan -0.21 -0.20 -0.08
Papua New Guinea* -0.25 -0.03 -0.21
Philippines 0.72 -0.18 -0.11
Samoa* 0.50 -0.30 0.01
Singapore -0.07 0.37 0.28
Solomon Islands* -0.16 0.46 0.02
Sri Lanka 0.05 0.68 0.26
Taiwan Province of China 0.32 0.33 0.58
Thailand 0.50 -0.31 -0.15
Tonga* 0.16 -0.02 0.30
Vanuatu* 0.53 0.35 0.35
Vietnam -0.02 -0.41 -0.50
Average 0.15 -0.01 0.04
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Table12. Inflation bias in Asia and Oceania (percentage points)
Country ¥ $ ￿
Australia 2.98 0.33 -0.56
Bangladesh 4.85 2.21 1.32
Bhutan 9.06 6.42 5.53
Brunei Darussalam 1.85 -0.79 -1.68
Cambodia 11.69 9.05 8.16
China 5.56 2.92 2.03
Fiji* 3.46 0.82 -0.07
Hong Kong SAR 1.12 -1.52 -2.41
India 6.60 3.96 3.07
Indonesia 15.13 12.49 11.60
Kiribati* 3.71 1.06 0.17
Korea 5.21 2.57 1.68
Lao People' s Democratic Republic 27.99 25.34 24.45
Malaysia 4.19 1.54 0.65
Maldives 3.87 1.23 0.34
Myanmar 28.14 25.49 24.60
Nepal 6.70 4.06 3.17
New Zealand 2.75 0.10 -0.79
Pakistan 8.51 5.87 4.98
Papua New Guinea* 8.58 5.94 5.05
Philippines 7.66 5.02 4.13
Samoa* 4.75 2.11 1.22
Singapore 1.50 -1.14 -2.03
Solomon Islands* 7.97 5.33 4.44
Sri Lanka 9.43 6.79 5.90
Taiwan Province of China 1.50 -1.14 -2.03
Thailand 3.64 1.00 0.11
Tonga* 5.78 3.14 2.25
Vanuatu* 2.84 0.20 -0.69
Vietnam 9.21 6.57 5.68
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Table13. Business Cycle Syncronization in the World (HP 6.25)
Country 1993-2005 1999-2005 Change
Africa 0.53 0.54 +
Asia and Oceania -0.66 -0.47 +
CISM 0.84 0.89 +
EMU 0.47 0.59 +
Europe (not EMU) 0.62 0.96 +
Middle East 0.02 0.41 +
US 0.19 0.60 +
Western Hemisphere 0.76 0.98 +
Average 0.35 0.56 +  
 
 




Asia and Oceania 6.27 5.19
EMU 2.82 2.40
Europe (not EMU) 8.07 3.86
Middle East 7.30 8.35
US 1.93 1.98
Western Emisphere 20.58 10.19
Average 52.00 8.88
Standard Deviation 115.96 7.17  